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The Right to Safe Schools: A Newly
Recognized Inalienable Right
In June, 1982, fifty-six percent of California voters approved Proposition 8, known as "The Victims' Bill of Rights."' The purpose of
Proposition 8, in the words of the initiative's coauthor, Paul Gann, is to
"restore victims' rights and help bring violent crime under control."2
The people of California perceived a need for an initiative designed to
fight crime because for the past twenty years the public had seen the
courts expand the rights of criminal defendants while the crime rate
was escalating The rising crime rate was attributed to the courts, 4 and
judges acquired the reputation of being soft on crime.' Proposition 8
was designed in part to eliminate legal rules that favored defendants so
that police and prosecutors would be better able to secure convictions
of criminals.' A concurrent purpose of Proposition 8 was to improve
the rights of victims of crime.7
Proposition 8 amended the California Constitution to include a recognition of constitutional rights for victims of crime.' The initiative
added to article I of the California Constitution sections 28(a) through
(g).9 This comment will focus on California Constitution, article I, section 28(c), (hereinafter referred to as the safe schools provision), which
guarantees the right to safe schools.'"
The safe schools provision states: 'Right to Safe Schools. All students and staff of primary, elementary, junior high and senior high
schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe,
secure and peaceful."" Some school administrators believe the safe
schools provision is merely a statement of policy and claim procedures
to promote safety on school campuses are currently in effect. 2 This
1. L. A. Daily J., Sept. 7, 1982, at 1, col. 2.
2. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, Primary Election, June 1982, at 34 (copy on file at the Pacpfc
Law Journal).
3. A 'Victims' Bill of Rights', NEWSWEEK, June 14, 1982, at 64.
4. See id.
5. Schrag, Crime on the Ballot, THE NEW REPUBLIC, June 2, 1982, at 10, 11.
6. See A 'Victims' Bill of Rights',supra note 3, at 64.
7. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 34.
8.See CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28.
9. See id
10. Id. §28(c).
11. Id.
12. L. A. Daily, J., Apr. 7, 1982, at 2, col. 5.
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comment will prove that this "inalienable" right to safe schools is much
more than a statement of policy.
The right to safe schools is a viable, enforceable right. Through rules
of constitutional construction, the right to safe schools may be interpreted to give students and staff members of public schools the right to
school campuses free of crime and violence. 3 The right is enforceable
by the California courts without implementing legislation. 4 This comment will demonstrate that the courts should enforce the safe schools
provision by imposing on school districts an affirmative duty to make
their schools safe. 5 A court, by giving the safe schools provision a
common sense interpretation, should find that the school districts have
a duty to make their schools safe. 6 Additionally, a court will impose
the duty by relying on federal and Califoriia cases which subscribe to
the principle that public entities may not withhold protection of constitutional rights if that withholding actually deprives people of a constitutional right. 7 Lastly, in imposing an affirmative duty, a court will
rely on the school desegregation cases which hold that school districts
are obligated to alleviate segregation in the schools to protect minority
students' constitutional rights.' 8
The comment will include a discussion of the costs involved in making schools safe. The possible cost of security measures, although substantial, will not be a bar to courts imposing an atfirmative duty on
school districts to make their schools safe.' 9 After establishing that the
right to safe schools is fully enforceable by the courts, this comment
will suggest two possible damages remedies, one based on tort law and
one based on the Constitution. Before a discussion of the enforceability of the safe schools provision, the provision itself must be interpreted. To understand fully the meaning of the safe schools provision,
an examination must be made of the events leading to its inclusion in
the Victims' Bill of Rights.
THE NEED FOR A SAFE SCHOOLS PROVISION

Student misbehavior has manifested itself in increasingly violent
ways over the past thirty years.2" Between 1950 and 1968, most incidents of misconduct consisted of pranks and disorders easily dealt with
13. See infra notes 71-120 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 126-65 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 181-204 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 207-40 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 241-61 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 266-300 and accompanying text.
20. Patsey, Curbing Violence and Vandalism in Our Schools: A Judicial View of What Must Be
Done, THRUST, Oct. 1981, at 11.
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by warnings and suspensions. 2 During the late sixties, students as a
group, generally became more aggressive and prone to violence. 22 This
trend of crime and violence on school campuses has not decreased,23
and today students and staff of public schools must attend schools
where drug dealing,2 4 theft, robbery, rape and murder are common
25
occurrences.
The violence and vandalism that are currently sweeping the nation's
schools26 are also present in the public schools of California. 7 Research completed in 1981 by the California Department of Education
revealed the following: over a five month period at least 100,000 incidents of violence occurred on school campuses; on the average twenty
four teachers were assaulted and 215 students were attacked daily; confiscation of weapons by school officials was common-place; and property damage due to crime amounted to approximately ten million
dollars.28 These incidents of crime and violence may be attributed to
juveniles. Juvenile arrests in California, as well as the nation, doubled
between 1964 and 1974.29 Although some targets of juvenile crime are
adults who are victimized off school campuses,3" most juvenile crime
victims are fellow students or teachers, with school campuses increasingly becoming the scene of crime.3' In the 1980 edition of Law in the
School, then Attorney General of California, George Deukmejian,
stated that the problem of crime and violence on school campuses is
now so severe that the learning environment is seriously impaired.32
The 1980 Legislature also recognized that crime and violence on
school campuses were becoming a serious problem. 33 The Legislature
added five sections to the California Education Code that dealt with
school safety and security.3 4 The first section of the Code recognized a
need to deal with crime and violence on school sites by creating effective techniques and programs to combat the crime and violence; 35 the
21. Id.
22. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF EDUCATION, VIOLENT SCHOOLS-SAFE SCHOOLS at 2 (Jan.
1978).
23. Id. at 3.
24. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW IN THE SCHOOL at 14 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as LAW
IN THE SCHOOL].

25. Patsey, supra note 20, at 11.
26. Id.
27. Deukmejian, Preface to CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW IN THE SCHOOL, at v (3d ed. 1980)

[hereinafter cited as Deukmejian].
28. Elder, Achieving School Safety in the 80s, STOP CUME, Winter 1982, at 4.
29. Deukmejian, supra note 27, at v.
30. Id. at vi.
31. Id.
32. Id. at vii.
33. CAL. EDUC. CODE §32250.

34. See id. §§32250-32254.
35. Id. §32250.
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second section created the School Safety and Security Resources Unit
(hereinafter referred to as Resources Unit) in the Department of Education to fulfill the need for safety and security.3 6 The function of the
Resources Unit was to identify effective programs being used by some
school districts and inform other districts of those programs, 37 to provide technical assistance to school districts implementing crime fighting
programs 38 and to ascertain the causes of school violence and inform
school districts of those causes.3 9 The fourth section obligated the Department of Education to evaluate the effectiveness of the Resources
Unit;4 the fifth section provided that the sections on school safety and
security would only become
effective if specifically appropriated funds
41
were made available.
The California Department of Justice attempted to deal with the increase in violent crime by opening the School Safety Center (hereinafter referred to as Center) in Sacramento in 1980.42 The goal of the
Center is to restore safety in the schools by providing leadership and
direction in reducing crime on campuses. 43 Some of the key components of the Center are a Law Enforcement Assistance Administration
grant which will develop crime prevention programs for elementary
schools," availability of Center staff for technical assistance in solving
specific problems of school crime, 45 and a program to alert the public to
the school safety issues and encourage public support for remedial
46
measures.
Another indication of the need for a constitutional amendment providing for safer schools was the filing of a lawsuit in 1980 by the California Attorney General against the Los Angeles Unified School
District (hereinafter referred to as LAUSD).4 7 The underlying premise
of the lawsuit was that students and educators had the right to learn
and teach in a peaceful environment. 48 The People ex rel. George
Deukmejian (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs) alleged the excessive
level of violence present in the LAUSD schools deprived attending stu36. Id. §32251. The original Resources Unit has since been abolished due to poor staff; a

new unit is being developed.
37. Id. §32252(a).
38. Id. §32252(b).

39. Id. §32252(c).
40. Id. §32253.
41. Id. §32254.
42. Cal. Dep't. of Justice, Office of the Attorney General Release, at 1 (Sept. 5, 1980) (copy
on file at the Pacfc Law Journal)[hereinafter cited as Attorney General Release].
43. Id
44. Id at 2.
45. Id at 3.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1.
48. Id.
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dents of their constitutional rights. 4 9
Each of plaintiffs' five arguments centered on the fact that excessive
levels of violence on school campuses effected a denial of plaintiffs'
constitutional rights:" (1) the plaintiffs alleged when the students were
required to attend school, the excessive level of violence at school violated the students' rights against cruel or unusual punishment;5"
(2) when the excessive level of violence disrupted the students' learning
environment, the students were denied their fundamental right to a free
public education;52 (3) the excessive level of violence at school denied
the students their fundamental right to personal security;5 3 (4) the students were denied equal protection of the laws when substantial disparities existed in the level of violence between the LAUSD and other
school districts; 54 and (5) when the government assigned the students to
a school with an excessive level of violence, the students did not receive
proper educations; hence, the government acted unreasonably, violating the substantive due process rights of the students. 5 The plaintiffs
contended that defendant LAUSD was responsible for protecting each
of the constitutional rights denied to the students. 6 Based upon the
above arguments, plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment of the constitutional rights of students attending LAUSD schools and the duties
57
of the defendant in relation to the students' rights.
The defendant LAUSD demurred to plaintiffs' complaint.5 The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained defendant's demurrer,
and plaintiffs appealed that decision to Division Four of the Second
District Court of Appeal.5 9 After plaintiffs filed their appellate brief,
the safe schools provision was approved by California voters, and
plaintiffs incorporated the provision into their closing argument.60 The
plaintiffs argued, in addition to their other arguments, that the students'
49. Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Demurrer at I, People ex rel. George Deukmejian,
No. C 323360 (Sup. Ct. County of L. A. filed May 21, 1980) (copy on file at the Pacfic Law
Journal).

50. See infra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
51. Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Demurrer at 33, No. C 323360.
52. Id. at 59.

53. Id. at 84.
54. Id. at 76; see also id. at 88 (violation of equal protection was based on the fundamental
right to personal security as well as the fundamental right to education).
55. Appellant's Opening Brief at 42, People ex rel. George Deukmejian, Nos. 64340 and
64341 (Ct. of Appeal Cal. filed -, 1982).
56. E.g., Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Demurrer at 62, No. C 323360; see also id. at 87.
57. Id. at 1.
58. See generally Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Demurrer, No. C 323360 (Defendants
must have demurred or this response would not have been filed).
59. Office of the Attorney General, Analysis of Proposition 8 (June 9, 1982); see also Telephone conversation with Robert Murphy, Deputy Attorney General (Nov. 30, 1982) (notes on fie
at the Facfc Law Journal).

60. Appellant's Closing Brief at 2, Nos. 64340 and 64341.
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right to safe, secure and peaceful campuses was violated by excessive
levels of violence at school.6 ' Plaintiffs requested the court to declare
that defendant LAUSD had a duty to take action to protect the constitutional rights of students.62 The appellate court, however, sustained
defendant's demurrer holding that the school district did not have an
affirmative duty to make the schools safe. 63 Plaintiffs appealed this
decision to the Supreme Court of California but that court denied
plaintiffs' petition for a hearing.64
The necessity for a safe schools provision is evidenced (1) by the recognition that crime and violence on school campuses is a serious problem65 and (2) by the attempts to solve that problem including the
School Safety Center 66 and the Attorney General's lawsuit against the
LAUSD. 67 The newly recognized inalienable right to safe schools is
another attempt to solve the problem of crime and violence on school
campuses. 68 The Attorney General recognized the potential of the safe
schools provision by adding the provision to his appellate brief to support the proposition that school districts have a duty to protect students
from violence while the students are attending school. 69 One purpose
of this comment is to demonstrate that enforcement of the safe schools
provision requires the courts to place an affirmative duty on school districts to make their schools safe.7" Before discussing how the courts
will enforce the safe schools provision, the provision must be
interpreted.
INTERPRETING THE NEW PROVISION

The safe schools provision states: "All students and staff of public
primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure and peaceful."'" The safe schools provision is a constitutional provision,7" and
the interpretation of a constitutional provision is guided by certain general rules of construction.73 The first step in interpreting a constitu61. See id. at 8.
62. See id. at 70.
63. Sacramento Bee, March 10, 1983, Section A, at 5, col. 2.
64. Id. at 5, col. 1.
65. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§32250-32254.
66. See Attorney General Release, supra note 42, at 1.
67. See id.
68. See infra notes 71-122 and accompanying text.
69. See Appellant's Closing Brief at 8, Nos. 64340 and 64341.
70. See infra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
71. CAL. CONST. art. I,§28(c).
72. See id.
73. See generally 13 CAL. JUR. 3d ConstitutionalLaw §§35-40 (discusses the methods of interpreting constitutional language).
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tional provision is to examine the language on the face of the
provision."4 Each word, phrase and sentence must be given its plain
meaning, and only if the meaning is doubtful or ambiguous may other
sources be used for interpretation." This section interprets the safe
schools provision by applying the above analysis.
.4.

'"nalienableRight"

The safe schools provision provides that students and staff of public
schools, elementary through senior high school, have an "inalienable
right" to safe campuses.7 6 Black's Law Dictionary defines "inalienable" as incapable of being surrendered or transferred.7 7 Accordingly,
inalienable rights are not given by the government nor may they be
taken away or impaired by the government.7 8 Inalienable rights are
those important and basic rights which stem from the fundamental
principles of the American system of government. 7 9 In California these
highly regarded rights are embodied in article I of the California Constitution, the Declaration of Rights." Inalienable rights, however, exist
independent of the Constitution and are inherent in every person.8 '
The inalienable right to safe schools, then, is inherent in each student
and staff member of a public school and is so fundamental to each that
the government may not terminate the right.82 Therefore, because the
right to safe, secure and peaceful campuses is recognized as inalienable,
the right should be seriously considered by courts, in interpreting the
right, and by school officials, in applying the right, as a viable right
rather than a mere policy statement.8 3 The inalienable right to safe
schools is confined to students and staff of public schools. The next
step to interpreting the safe schools provision is to define the class of
persons protected under this important right; therefore, "students and
staff" must be interpreted.
B.

"Students and Staff'

Webster's Dictionary clearly defines a student as a person who is enrolled for study at school.84 The meaning of staff, however, is not as
74. State Board of Education v. Levit, 52 Cal. 2d 441, 462, 343 P.2d 8, 20 (1959).
75. Id.
76. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(c).
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (5th ed. 1979).
78. See id. (definition of inalienable); see also infra notes 79-81 and accompanying text.
79. See People v. Washington, 36 Cal. 658, 662 (1869) (overruled on other grounds in People
v. Brady, 40 Cal. 198); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3d ConstitutionalLaw §223 (1974).
80. See CAL. CONST. art. I §1.
81. In re Quarg, 149 Cal. 79, 80, 84 P. 766, 766 (1906).
82. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.

83. See supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.

84.

WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2268 (1971).
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clear. Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines staff as
the personnel responsible for the functioning of an institution. 5 The
safe schools provision does not indicate which of the personnel responsible for the functioning of the school constitutes staff.8 6 The meaning
of staff, then, is unclear, and extrinsic aids must be used for interpretation. 7 Examples of extrinsic aids are official reports of the California
Constitution Revision Commission," records of debates,8 9 legislative
committee reports, 90 contemporaneous interpretation, 91 written arguments in voter pamphlets, 92 public policy 93 and the evils sought to be
remedied by the provision.9 4
The meaning of staff may be ascertained by examining the evil
sought to be remedied by the safe schools provision. 95 The evil sought
to be remedied by the safe schools provision is the presence of violent
crime on school campuses.9 6 Victims of violent crime on school campuses have included teachers and janitors. 97 A logical conclusion is
that one of the evils sought to be remedied by the safe schools provision
is the victimization of teachers and janitors. 98 This extrinsic aid, the
evils sought to be remedied, demonstrates that the meaning of staff
should include at least teachers and janitors9 9 and may be extended to
include any personnel responsible for the functioning of the school that
may be victimized by crime, such as administrators and counselors. " °
Thus far, this comment has established that students and all staff members have an inalienable right to attend safe, secure and peaceful campuses. What is meant by a safe, secure and peaceful campus will be
discussed next.
C.

"Safe, Secure andPeaceful"

The meaning of each word, safe, secure and peaceful, is not particu85. Id. at 2219.
86. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §28(c).
87. See 52 Cal. 2d at 462, 343 P.2d at 20.

88. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474,495, 601 P.2d 1030, 1045, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 509
(1979).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 129 Cal. App. 3d
876, 881, 181 Cal. Rptr. 370, 372 (1982) (quoting English v. County of Alameda, 70 Cal. App. 3d
226, 233-34, 138 Cal. Rptr. 634, 638).
94. Id.
95. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
96. See infra notes 111-22 and accompanying text.
97. See Deukmejian, supra note 27, at v, vi.
98. See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
99. Id.
100. See supra notes 85-99 and accompanying text.
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larly ambiguous. Webster's Dictionary defines safe as "secure from
threat of danger, harm, or loss."'' 1 Danger, harm or loss, however,
may come from many sources such as fire, earthquake, or crime, but
the dictionary does not indicate any specific source. 10 2 This same problem arises when defining secure and peaceful. The definition of secure
is "free from danger" or "free from risk of loss." 10 3 Peaceful is defined
as "untroubled by conflict, agitation, or commotion."''
Again, neither
of the definitions indicates the source of the danger or the agitation.
Extrinsic aids must be referred to in determining what is a safe, secure and peaceful campus because of the ambiguities involved in the
definitions of safe, secure and peaceful. The extrinsic aids available for
interpreting the safe schools provision include a committee analysis of
the safe schools provision, evidence of the intent of the voters who approved Proposition 8, and the California Supreme Court's recent ruling
on the constitutionality of Proposition 8.105 Other extrinsic aids such as
official reports of the California Constitution Revision Commission
and records of debates are not available because Proposition 8 was not
proposed by the legislature, but was passed under the initiative process
by the people of California. 06
The first extrinsic aid is an analysis of the safe schools provision by
the Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice.' 7 The report discusses
the possibility of deploying municipal police to school campuses to enforce the safe schools provision.'0 8 Common sense dictates that police
would not be necessary to protect students and staff from ordinary accidents; more likely the police will be deployed on school campuses to
protect students and staff from crime because repressing crime is a typical law enforcement function.' 0 9 A logical conclusion is that a safe,
secure and peaceful campus is one that is free from crime. 110
An important extrinsic aid for interpretation is evidence of the intent
and objective of the drafters of the safe schools provision and the people by whose vote the provision was adopted. This intent and objective
WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1998 (1971).
102. See id.
103. Id. at 780.
104. Id. at 620.
105. See infra notes 107-119 and accompanying text.
106. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d 236, 240, 651 P.2d 274, 276, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 32
(1982).
107. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION 8, (1982) (report to the California Legislature of 1982).
108. Id. at 7.
109. See People v. Seely, 66 Cal. App. 2d 408, 412, 152 P. 2d 454, 456 (1944); see also 42 CAL.
JUR. 3d Law Enforcement §57 (1974).
110. See supra notes 107-109 and accompanying text.
101.
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may be ascertained from written arguments in voter pamphlets." I The
written arguments in the June, 1982, voter pamphlet do not specifically
address the safe schools provision;" t2 however, the objectives of Proposition 8 as a whole are discussed.' 13 The overall objectives of Proposition 8 may be applied to the individual provisions of the initiative." 14
All three arguments in favor of Proposition 8 discuss the problem of
high crime rates and violence:' '1 "It is time for the people to take decisive action against violent crime,""' 6 "Crime has increased to an absolutely intolerable level,"''1 "Your 'Yes' vote on Proposition 8 will
restore victims' rights and help bring violent crime under control." I
These statements indicate that the intent of the voters in passing Proposition 8 was to fight back against crime. This overall intent may be
applied to the safe schools provision thus leading to the conclusion that
the voters desired school campuses to be free from crime and violence.
The above interpretation is amply supported by the California
Supreme Court's recent ruling in Brosnahan v. Brown." 9 The Bros-

nahan court ruled that Proposition 8 did not violate the single subject
rule of the California Constitution. 20 The court also declared that article I, section 28, subdivision (c), the safe schools provision, was intended to encompass safety only from criminal behavior. 2 ' The new
constitutional right to safe schools is designed to protect students and
staff from crime and violence while attending public schools. 122 The
next section is a two part discussion of how this right will be enforced.
The first part will demonstrate that the safe schools provision is a selfexecuting right that does not require implementing legislation to be enforced by the courts.
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE SAFE SCHOOLS PROVISION

Some school officials view the safe schools provision simply as a polIlI. Mosk v. Superior Court, 25 Cal. 3d 474,495, 601 P. 2d 1030, 1045, 159 Cal. Rptr. 494, 509
(1979).
112. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 34-35 (written arguments on Proposition 8).
113. See id.
114. See Brosnahan v. Brown, 32 Cal. 3d at 247,651 P.2d at 280, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
115. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 34 (written arguments on Proposition 8).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
120. Id. at 253. The California Constitution provides that initiative measures submitted to
electors must embrace only one subject or the initiative will be deemed to have no effect. CAL.
CONsT. art. II, §8, subd. (d). Although Proposition 8 had ten sections, the Brosnahan court held
that all sections shared a common purpose of promoting the rights of crime victims; therefore, the
initiative satisfied the single subject rule. 32 Cal. 3d at 247.
121. Id. at 248.
122. See supra notes 101-121 and accompanying text.
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icy statement.' 23 A policy statement itself does nothing active toward
fighting crime on school campuses, and this interpretation is contrary
to the intent of the voters, as postulated in the previous section, that
schools be free from crime and violence.' 24 This section will show the
safe schools provision mandates that school districts have an affirmative duty to make their schools safe.' 25 Before the courts will order the
school districts to make their schools safe, the courts must determine
that the safe schools provision is enforceable without implementing
legislation.
A.

The Right to Safe Schools is Enforceable Without Implementing
Legislation

California Supreme Court Justice Mosk and Chief Justice Bird criticized Proposition 8 for containing no legislation that purported to implement the right to safe schools.' 26 If legislation is necessary to
27
implement this right, the right to safe schools is not self-executing,
and the courts may not enforce the provision until appropriate legislation is provided.' 28 On the other hand, if the right is self-executing, 29it is
immediately operative and the courts may enforce its provisions.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if no legislation is necessary to give effect to the provision and if there is nothing to be done by
the Legislature to put the provision into operation.' 30 A provision is
not self-executing if language or circumstance indicate that implementing legislation was contemplated to put the right into effect. '3' The
courts determine if a constitutional provision is self-executing by examining the provision under several established rules.
One method used to determine whether a constitutional provision is
self-executing is to look at the language of the provision, and if the
language indicates the subject of the provision is referred to the Legislature for action, the provision is not self-executing.' 32 In Taylor v.
Madigan 133 the provision in question was article XVII, section 1, of the
123. L. A. Daily J., April 19, 1982, at 2, col. 5.
124. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
126. 32 Cal. 3d at 274-75, 651 P.2d at 297, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 53 (1982) (Bird, C.J., dissenting);
see also Brosnahan v. Eu, 31 Cal. 3d 1, 11-12, 641 P.2d 206, 181 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1982) (Mosk, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
127. Ewing v. Oroville Mining Co., 56 Cal. 649, 653 (1880); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3d Constitutional Law §31 (1974).
128. Spinney v. Griffith, 98 Cal. 149, 151-52, 32 P. 974, 975 (1893).
129. Winchester v. Mabury, 122 Cal. 522, 523-24, 55 P. 393 (1898).
130. Taylor v. Madigan, 53 Cal. App. 3d 943, 951, 126 Cal. Rptr. 376, 381 (1975).
131. Id.
132. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (1975).
133. Id. at 943, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (1975).
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California Constitution which states "the Legislature shall protect, by
law, from forced sale a certain portion of the homestead and other
property of all heads of families."' 34 That provision was held not selfexecuting because of the express language stating the Legislature shall
create an exemption of a homestead. 35 This language indicates that
the Constitution itself does not provide a homestead exemption. 136 The
provision would have been self-executing
if the provision had only
37
exempt.'
is
homestead
a
stated
There is no express language in the safe schools provision directing
the Legislature to take action in any way associated with the safe
schools provision.' 38 The constitutional provision simply states that
students and staff of public schools have the inalienable right to attend
safe campuses. 39 The language here indicates that the Constitution
itself guarantees the right, not the Legislature. 40 If the courts use the
v. Madiexpress language method of determination adopted in Taylor
41
gan, then the safe schools provision may be self-executing.'
In Taylor, the court gives another test to determine the self-executing
nature of a constitutional provision. If the constitution fixes the nature
and extent of the right conferred and the liability imposed so that they
may be determined by examining and construing the terms of the provision, the constitutional provision must be self-executing. 142 The right
conferred by the safe schools provision is the inalienable right of students and staff of public schools to attend safe, secure and peaceful
campuses. The nature and extent of this right have been determined by
43
general rules of construction in the previous section of this comment
and may be summarized as the right of students and staff members of
public schools to be safe from criminal behavior.'" The nature and
extent of the liability imposed may also be determined by examining
the terms of the provision. The safe schools provision is an inalienable
right meaning the right, as embodied in the California Constitution, is
134. CAL. CONsT. art. XviI, §1.
135. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
136. See id.
137. See id.
138. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(c).
139. Id.
140. See 53 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 381. The language in the Homestead provision expressly stated the Legislature shall protect homesteads. The language here does not mention the Legislature at all and, therefore, is an indication that the constitution guarantees the right
to safe schools.
141. See supra notes 132-140 and accompanying text.
142. 53 Cal. App. 3d at 951, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
143. See supra notes 72-122 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 72-122 and accompanying text.
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protected against government impairment.' 4 5 The liability imposed,
then, by the safe schools provision is a liability of the state when the
state is responsible for infringing the students' or staff members' right
to be free from criminal behavior. 146 The nature and extent rule indicates that the safe schools provision is self-executing.
A self-executing constitutional provision has also been defined as a
provision that supplies a sufficient rule whereby the right given may be
enjoyed and protected, or the duty imposed may be enforced.' 4 7 This
rule was applied by the court in Unger v. Superior Court'4 8 to California Constitution, article II, section 6 which provides, "Judicial, school,
county, and city offices shall be non-partisan."' 4 9 The Unger court
held the constitutional provision was self-executing and supported that
holding by deciding the provision adequately supplied a rule by which
the duty imposed could be enforced. 5 0
This rule may be applied to the safe schools provision. The Unger
court focused on a sufficient rule whereby the duty imposed could be
enforced. The pertinent question regarding the safe schools provision,
however, would be whether there is an adequate rule whereby the right
conferred may be enjoyed and protected.' 5 ' If the Unger court could
find an adequate rule to enforce a duty imposed in simple language like
"[j]udicial, school, county, and city offices shall be non-partisan," then
an adequate rule to protect a right conferred could also be found in the
more detailed language of the safe schools provision that "students and
staff of primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools have
the inalienable right to attend campuses which are safe, secure, and
peaceful."' 52 Furthermore, the Unger court emphasized the fact that
the people had constitutionally commanded that the offices be non-partisan in determining the provision was self-executing.' t 3 This same emphasis would support the determination that the safe schools provision
is self-executing because the provision was also commanded by the
people of California.' 54
145. See Logan v. U. S., 144 U.S. 263, 281 (1892) (civil rights declared in constitutions are
guaranteed against state aggression); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3d ConstitutionalLaw §223 (1974).
146. See supra note 145.
147. Flood v. Riggs, 80 Cal. App. 3d 138, 154, 145 Cal. Rptr. 573, 582 (1978).
148. 102 Cal. App. 3d 681, 162 Cal. Rptr. 611 (1980).
149. CAL. CONST. art. II, §6.
150. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 687, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 614-15.
151. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(c); see also id. art. II, §6. The safe schools provision's language on its face confers a right to students and staff. The language of CAL. CONsT. art. II, §6,
however, indicates a duty to keep those offices nonpartisan.
152. See 102 Cal. App. 3d at 687, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 614; see also CAL. CONsT. art. I, §28(c).
153. 102 Cal. App. 3d at 687, 162 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
154. See 32 Cal. 3d at 240-41, 651 P.2d at 276-77, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 32-33. The safe schools
provision was an initiative placed on the ballot under the initiative and referendum power of the
Constitution. In a sense, then, the people have commanded that the school campuses be safe.
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Other evidence lends support to the determination that the inalienable right to attend safe, secure and peaceful campuses is self-executing.
In the past, constitutions were written to give only the outlines of a
government, but today, constitutions are written in a very detailed, statutory-like manner. Constitutional provisions are presumed to be selfexecuting because of this trend unless there is clear evidence to the contrary.' 5 5 Nothing in the safe schools provision indicates that the right
would not be operative until the Legislature acted; 56 therefore, the safe
schools provision is presumed to be self-executing. 57 This presumption is compatible with the policy underlying self-executing provisions.' 58 These provisions are necessary because if a constitution were
dependent on the acts of the Legislature, beneficial provisions of the
of the inability of legislators to
constitution might be delayed because
59
agree on implementing legislation.'
California courts have held that other inalienable rights are self-executing, such as the right to privacy 60 and the right to free speech and
press.' 6 1 The courts are generally conclusionary, stating only that the
provision is self-executing,16 2 but their conclusion is appropriate for the
following reason. A self-executing provision is one that is in effect immediately and does not depend on the Legislature to give it life. 1 63 An
inalienable right is also, by definition, not dependent on the Legislature
for existence, for inalienable rights are not granted by the government
but inherent in every person. 64 The courts, therefore, are justified in
concluding that inalienable rights are self-executing.
According to the rules used to determine the self-executing nature of
a constitutional provision, the inalienable right to safe schools must be
self-executing.' 6 5 This determination is consistent with the presumption that constitutional provisions are self-executing 66 and with the
policy underlying the existence of self-executing provisions. 67 The
courts may enforce the safe schools provision without implementing
5 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW ConsitudonalLaw §38 (8th ed. 1974).
156. See CAL. CONST. art. I, §28(c).
157. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text.
158. See Scott v. Larson, 82 Cal. App. 46, 50, 255 P. 248, 249-50 (1927).
159. Id.
160. Eg., Porten v. University of San Francisco, 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839,
842 (1976).
161. See Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found. of Laguna Hills, 131 Cal. App. 3d
816, 851 n.16, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 834 (1982).
162. 64 Cal. App. 3d at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
163. Winchester v. Mabury, 122 Cal. 522, 523-24, 55 P. 393 (1898); 13 CAL. JUR. 3d ConsitlutionalLaw §31 (1974).
164. See In re Quarg, 149 Cal. 79, 80, 84 P. 766 (1906).
165. See supra notes 126-64 and accompanying text.
166. See WITKIN, supra note 155, §38.
167. See 82 Cal. App. at 50, 255 P. at 249-50.
155.
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legislation once the provision is determined to be self-executing. 68
The courts may enforce the right by imposing an affirmative duty on
school districts to make their schools safe. 169 The next section is an
examination of the processes the courts may use to impose this duty.
These processes consist of reliance upon constitutional interpretation,
federal and California case law determining that a public entity may
not withhold protection if the withholding deprives a person of constitutional rights and California case law providing that school districts
have an affirmative duty to desegregate schools.
B.

An Affirmative Duty to Make Schools Safe

Courts will play a very important role in enforcing the inalienable
right to safe schools since the function of a court is to interpret the
Constitution and define the constitutional rights of citizens of this
state. 7 Additionally, courts must vigorously protect the rights embodied in the safe schools provision as the duty of the courts is to guard
those rights created by the people through their reserved powers of initiative and referendum. 17 1 To protect the constitutional right of students and staff of public schools to attend safe, secure and peaceful
campuses, the courts must find that school districts have an affirmative
duty to make their schools safe.172
A major obstacle to imposing an affirmative duty on school districts
is the provisions of the California Constitution generally placing restrictions upon the powers of the state. 173 In the context of inalienable
rights, this principle may be understood to mean that inalienable rights,
embodied in the Constitution, are merely guaranteed against state impairment.'"
Accordingly, the inalienable right to safe, secure and
peaceful campuses would not be violated until the state acted to deprive students and staff of their right to safe, secure and peaceful

campuses. 175
This interpretation, however, would not adequately guarantee the
right to be free from violence and crime on school campuses since inaction has been recognized as a significant cause in the increase of crime
168. See supra notes 126-67 and accompanying text.
169. See infra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
170. Nougues v. Douglas, 7 Cal. 65,70 (1857); see also 13 CAL. JUR. 3d ConstitutionalLaw §96
(1974).
171. 32 Cal. 3d at 241, 651 P.2d at 277, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
172. See infra notes 173-263 and accompanying text.
173. See Methodist Hosp. v. Saylor, 5 Cal. 3d 685, 691, 488 P.2d 161, 164, 97 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5
(1971); see 13 CAL. JUR. 3d ConstitutionalLaw §223 (1974); see also id. §224.
174. See supra note 173.
175. Id.
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on school campuses. 176 In 1980, a task force of the Association of California School Administrators (hereinafter referred to as ACSA) made a
study of student discipline problems, including violence and vandalism, and discovered that school districts actually contributed to the
problem because of their inaction. 7 7 While most school boards are
genuinely outraged at poor student behavior and violent acts, they
do
7
not consider themselves responsible for eliminating the problem.
Asa Reeves, 1981 urban services executive at ACSA, is opposed to
the view that school boards have no responsibility to make their
schools safe:
Our inaction contributed to the lack of discipline and allowed violent acts to become a part of the school environment. . . . we cannot
wait for the attorney general, the probation department, the courts or
the Legislature to solve
the problem but instead must take matters
179
into our own hands.
This point of view is embodied in the safe schools provision as ascertained through rules of interpretation.8 0
L

An Affirmative Duty By Interpretation

Imposing an affirmative duty on school districts to make their
schools safe may be based on rules of constitutional construction. One
long recognized rule is that new provisions must be considered in reference to the prior state of the law and the mischief intended to be remedied by the new provisions.'l8 Another established rule of construction
is that constitutional enactments must be given a practical, common
sense construction which will meet changed conditions and the growing
needs of the public. 8
An examination of the law prior to the enactment of Proposition 8
reveals that school officials do have some responsibility to protect the
safety of students and staff members of public schools.' 8 3 School officials have a duty to maintain an orderly campus so the education,
teaching and training of students may be accomplished in an atmosphere of law and order.' 84 Pursuant to this duty, the school official
may suspend, expel, or exclude from school students who have dis176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Reeves, We Let It Happen-We Can Change It, THRUST, Oct. 1981, at 8, 9.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
See infra notes 181-204 and accompanying text.
People v. Stephens, 62 Cal. 209, 233 (1882).
Cooperrider v. San Francisco Civil Serv. Comm'n, 97 Cal. App. 3d 495, 502, 158 Cal.

Rptr. 801, 805 (1979).
183. See infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
184. In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 512, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220, 222 (1969).

1983 / Safe Schools

played behavior inimical to the welfare of other students."8 5 The behavior that merits suspension, expulsion or exclusion must be criminal
or violent in nature.' 8 6 Although the authority to rid schools of students who commit criminal or violent acts appears to work directly on
removing crime and violence from school campuses, the provisions
which govern the suspension, expulsion and exclusion of students from
school are only grants of authority to school officials to rid their schools
of students who have already committed violent or criminal acts or
who have already displayed vicious characters. 87
Some provisions do place a duty on school officials to guard against
student misconduct. For example, the school official has a duty to prescribe rules for governing the discipline of students. 88 The Code providing for this duty was amended in 1977 to place a duty on the
principal of a high school to make sure that students are informed of
the disciplinary rules at the beginning of each school year. 8 9 Creating
and communicating a clear, concise policy on student misconduct is
instrumental to the control of violence and vandalism on school campuses.' 9 0 The 1980 ACSA task force discovered most school districts
either had no policies on student misconduct or had not communicated
existing policies to the people most affected. 9 '
The state of the law prior to the enactment of the safe schools provi92
sion includes no active program to rid schools of crime and violence.
The suspension, expulsion and exclusion laws which deal specifically
with criminal and violent acts are merely grants of authority to suspend, expel or exclude students after the act has occurred. 93 This passive method of dealing with violence and crime may not be adequate
today when theft, arson, rape, murder and drug dealing are common
events on school campuses. 94 Indeed, juvenile arrests doubled between
95
1964 and 1974 and continued to increase throughout the 1970's.
From 1974 to 1978 the number of juvenile deaths due to homicide
185. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §§48900, 48904.5, 48211.
186. A student may be suspended or expelled for nine acts. See id. §48900(a)-(i). Six of the
nine acts are criminal or violent in nature. See id. §48900(a)-(f). The student may be excluded
from school for displaying filthy or vicious habits. Id. §48211.
187. See generally, id. §48900. From the language in the Code it is obvious the student's
misconduct must have already occurred. Also, the Code does not say a principal shall suspend,
which indicates suspension is a discretionary duty.
188. Id. §35291.
189. Id.
190. Reeves, supra note 176, at 10.
191. Id. at 9.
192. See infra notes 193-202 and accompanying text.
193. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §48900(a)-(f).
194. Palsey,supra note 20, at 11; see also LAW IN THE ScHooL., supra note 24, at 14.
195. See Deukmejian, supra note 27, at v.
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alone increased 107 percent.

96

The evils sought to be remedied by the safe schools provision are
crime and violence.197 A construction of the safe schools provision allowing school districts to do no more than they are doing now will not
further the intent of the voters who approved this provision. 98 While
the suspension and expulsion laws are designed to rid the schools of

students who have violent or criminal natures,

99

those laws are not

effective until after the criminal or violent act has occurred. 200 Also,
even though school officials already have a duty to create and commu-

nicate clear disciplinary policies for students, 20 ' this duty does not appear to be strictly implemented. 0 2 A logical conclusion is that the
voters desired a strong affirmative duty to be placed on school officials

to prevent crime and violence on school campuses.
This construction is a practical and common sense interpretation of
the safe schools provision and will meet the changed conditions and the

growing needs of the public. As one commentator suggested, school
district inaction actually promotes violence and vandalism on school
campuses.20 3 If the mandate of the safe schools provision is to prevent
crime and violence, a common sense interpretation would require the
school district to act. 20 4 The safe schools provision should be interpreted to mandate that an affirmative duty be placed on school districts
to make their schools safe. Federal and California case law supports

this interpretation. 205 Federal case law intimates that a public entity
may be obligated to act in order to protect constitutional rights.20 6 The

next section discusses the applicability of this principle to California
school districts.
196. Id. at vi.
197. See supra notes 107-122 and accompanying text.
198. See Reeves, supra note 176, at 9. The intent of the voters is to rid the schools of crime
and violence. When the school districts do not actively fight those evils, this intent of the voters is
thwarted, especially when the inaction may be said to be a cause of the crime and violence.
199. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §48900; see also id. §48904.5.
200. See supra note 187.
201. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §35291.
202. See Reeves, supra note 176, at 9. The task force found that most school districts had no
disciplinary policies.
203. Id.
204. When school districts have actively sought to prevent crime and violence on school campuses they have been successful. The Hayward Unified School District was able to reduce crime
by using a computer monitor system. Harris, Cramping Your 4rsonist's Style and Cutting Energy
Costs-All by Computer, THRUST, Oct. 1981, at 18. Los Angeles Unified School District has implemented a program which links the juvenile court, district attorney and public defender offices
with the school system in order to identify violence prone juveniles and help them to adjust to
normal school life. Thompson, andalism--Cutting Techniques that Worked For Us, THRUST,
Oct. 1981, at 13.
205. See infra notes 207-40 and accompanying text.
206. See infra notes 207-27 and accompanying text.
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An Affirmative Duty by Analogy to Federal Case Law

The idea that a public entity has an affirmative duty to protect constitutional rights is not new to the courts. In a dissenting opinion of a
1951 United States Supreme Court case, Justice Black argued that policemen had a duty to protect a speaker from a hostile audience in order to allow the speaker to exercise his first amendment rights.20 1 This,
of course, is contrary to the principle that constitutional rights are
merely guaranteed against government interference. 20 8 Federal courts,
however, have subscribed to the idea that the public entity must affirmatively act to protect constitutional rights when nonaction causes a deprivation of those rights.20 9
This principle was applied by the United States Supreme Court in
Terry v. Adams.21 ° In Texas, a private association called the Jaybird
Party excluded all black voters of the county from being members.21 '
Each election year, the Jaybird Party elected people who were to enter
the Democratic primaries for nomination to run for county offices in
the county elections.2 12 The people who were elected by the Jaybird
Party to run in the Democratic primaries were invariably nominated to
run for county offices. 2 3 The Court held the state was responsible for
the actions of the Jaybird Party in discriminating against blacks even
though the association was not controlled by the state.2 14 The Court
then held the state was obligated to protect the constitutional rights of
black voters although the Jaybird association, rather than the state, was
actually responsible for the infringement of the voter's rights.21 5
Other federal cases have held that state protection of constitutional
rights may not be withheld. In Lynch v. United States,2 16 a state sheriff
surrendered a prisoner to a mob of Ku Klux Klansmen who proceeded
to beat the prisoner. 17 The court of appeals held that the prisoner's
right to equal protection included the right of protection by the arresting officer against injury by third persons. 2 18 Although in Lynch,
under the cause of action used, the sheriff had to have intended to deprive the prisoner of his rights, 1 9 the court recognized that denial of
207. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 327 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting).
208. See supra note 173.

209. See infra notes 210-27 and accompanying text.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

345 U.S. 461, 465 (1953).
Id. at 463.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 469.
Id.
189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951).
Id. at 480.
Id. at 479.
Id. at 480.
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constitutional rights could be brought about by official inaction.22 0 In
this case, where the sheriffs action was necessary to protect the pris-

oner, the sheriff was not allowed to deny protection willfully.221 In a
similar factual setting, the circuit court in Calette v. United States2 2 2
held that a sheriff, who had detained Jehovah's Witnesses, after they
had requested protection while carrying on their work, could not deny
protection to the Jehovah's Witnesses from a town mob.223 In failing to
protect the Jehovah's Witnesses from group violence, the sheriff denied
them equal protection of the laws.2 24

A school district certainly may argue that these federal cases are inapplicable to the school district because it has not intended to deny to
students and staff members of public schools any constitutional rights
as did the sheriffs in Catlette and Lynch. A crucial fact in those cases,
however, was that the sheriffs did have the power to afford protection
to their detainees, yet in both cases protection was not attempted. A
school district has the authority to protect its students' health and welfare just as the sheriffs had the authority to protect their detainees.225 If
a school district may, by simple action, successfully protect students
against violence,226 then the district should not be allowed to refuse to
protect students and staff members. Inaction by the school district violates the constitutional right of students and staff to be safe from crime
and violence while attending school. This conclusion is consistent with
the holdings of Catlette andLynch that the sheriffs' inaction was a deprivation of their detainees' constitutional rights.
The United States Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts have
evidenced the position that when government action could prevent a
deprivation of federal constitutional rights, action should not be denied.227 California courts have also subscribed to this position. The
California Supreme Court has ordered the California Legislature to reapportion itself to protect voters' rights228 and certain California school
districts to desegregate to protect students' rights.2 2 9
220. Id. at 479.
221. Id.
222. 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
223. Id. at 907; see also id. at 903.
224. Id. at 907.
225. See CAL. EDUC. CODE §44807. This is one method whereby the school officials may
protect students' health. Other methods are the power to suspend and expel. See Id. §48900; see
also id. §48904.5.

226. See Reeves, supra note 176, at 10 (simple communication of a disciplinary policy proves
successful in cutting crime and violence).
227. See supra notes 207-26 and accompanying text.
228. See Legislature v. Reinecke, 6 Cal. 3d 595, 598, 492 P.2d 385, 387, 99 Cal. Rptr. 481, 483

(1972).
229. See Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 284, 551 P.2d 28, 30, 130 Cal. Rptr.
724, 726 (1976).
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3. An Affirmative Duty by Analogy to California Case Law
The California Supreme Court proscribed government inaction in
Legislature v. Reinecke,2 3 0 (hereinafter referred to as Reinecke I). The
court found the legislative apportionment in 1972 violated the constitutional principle of one man, one vote.231 The Legislature was required
to enact valid reapportionment statutes in time for the 1972 elections.2 32 The California Supreme Court retained jurisdiction over the
subject matter to draft reapportionment plans itself in the event that the
Legislature failed to adopt plans for the 1974 through 1980 elections.2 33
The Supreme Court later adopted apportionment plans pursuant to its
retained jurisdiction in a second Legislature v. Reinecke2 1 (hereinafter
referred to as Reinecke I). Although the Legislature is required by the
California Constitution to reapportion itself after a ten year census, the
Reinecke cases stand for the idea that when citizens' constitutional
rights are in jeopardy, the court will not tolerate inaction. 3 5
In Reinecke I, the court recognized that reapportionment was solely
a job for the Legislature and only after the court recognized that reapportionment might not occur in time for the 1972 elections did the
court itself provide the action to protect the voters' equal protection
rights.2 36 If the court is willing to get involved in a job left to the Legislature, the court must feel strongly about protecting constitutional
rights and will not hesitate to order government action. 37 A logical
conclusion is that the court will also not tolerate inaction on the part of
school districts, especially when protection of students is in the province of the school district, and will not hesitate to order the school districts to make schools safe.
Other public officials besides legislators have a duty to prevent violations of California citizens' constitutional rights. A current body of
constitutional law holds that a criminal defendant is denied equal protection and due process of the law at his indictment when there has
been an intentional exclusion from the grand jury of a particular class
of persons in the community.2 3 8 Public officials who compile jury lists
are constitutionally restrained from excluding whole classes of people
230. See 6 Cal. 3d at 598, 492 P.2d at 387, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
231. Id. at 601, 492 P.2d at 387, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 485.
232. Id. at 603, 492 P.2d at 391, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
233. Id. at 604, 492 P.2d at 391, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 487.
234. See 10 Cal. 3d 396, 400-401, 516 P.2d 6, 8-9, 110 Cal. Rptr. 718, 720 (1973).
235. 6 Cal. 3d at 598, 492 P.2d at 387, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 483. In Reinecke I, the court threatened
to use its power to impose reapportionment plans to ensure voter equality. The court carried out
the threat in Reinecke II.
236. 6 Cal. 3d at 598, 492 P.2d at 386-87, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 482.
237. See id.
238. See People v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 966, 970, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735 (1974).
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in the community from the lists.23 9 These official compilers, however,
must do more than merely avoid purposeful discrimination. They have
an affirmative duty to insure the procedures used to select potential
jurors actively work toward achieving a well balanced cross-section of
the community.2 4 ° The affirmative duty to remedy discrimination is
not limited to public officials compiling jury lists. The school official
also has a duty to remedy discrimination.
The strongest support for imposing a duty on school districts to make
their schools safe is found in school desegregation cases. 241 In 1954, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that segregated school systems violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.24 2
In a series of cases the Court began to order school districts to implement plans designed to rid the school systems of segregation.24 3 The
Court finally decided in Green v. County School Board244 that school
boards have the duty to devise a plan to desegregate their schools without delay.2 45 The California Supreme Court has similarly ruled that
segregated school systems in this state violate the Equal Protection
24 6
Clause of the Constitution.
Pursuant to a finding that segregation violates the equal protection
clause, the California Supreme Court in Crawford v. Board of Education247 held that school districts are obligated to undertake reasonable
steps toward alleviating school segregation.24 8 The court also held that
the school district did not have to be the cause of the segregation.2 4 9
The rationale of this decision is two-fold. First, segregated schools
have traditionally had a detrimental effect on minority children,2 -0 and
second, in the state of California education is a fundamental right
which should not be impaired.Y
If the courts may order a school district to take steps to alleviate
segregation in the school system, the courts should also order the school
district to take steps to alleviate crime and violence on school cam239. Id. at 972, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
240. Id.
241. Seegeneral, Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 606 (1963); Crawford v. Board of Education, 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724
(1976).
242. Brown v. Board of Educ., 247 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
243. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 564-66
(1978).
244. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
245. Id. at 438-39.
246. Jackson v. Pasadena, 59 Cal. 2d 876, 880, 382 P.2d 878, 880-81, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606, 608-609
(1963).
247. 17 Cal. 3d 280, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
248. ld. at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 296.
251. Id. at 297.
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puses. Crime and violence certainly have a harmful effect on the education process as does segregation.2 52 Segregation impairs the learning
process by impeding academic achievement of the minority student. 5 3
Crime and violence, because of the fear they create in students, impede
the academic achievement of all students.25 4 Another aspect of the
Crawford court's decision to impose an affirmative duty to desegregate
was that the school district had plenary authority over the governance
of its schools and could adopt nondiscriminatory policies. 5 The
school district today also has the authority to govern the safety of students 256 and, therefore, can adopt plans to make schools safe.
One major complaint of school districts may be that school districts
do not cause crime and violence on school campuses. 25 7 This complaint is valid because the cause of juvenile violence and vandalism is
generally unknown, and none of the typically named causes of violence
is the school district itself.258 The school districts in the segregation
cases also complained that they were not the cause of segregation.2 59
The courts, nevertheless, held that the cause of the segregation was immaterial,2 60 and the school district was not relieved of its duty when the
cause of segregation was, for example, a racially imbalanced neighborhood.2 6 ' Pursuant to this reasoning, the courts will be justified in imposing an affirmative duty on school districts to make their schools safe
regardless of the cause of the crime and violence.
By placing an affirmative duty on school boards to make their
schools safe, the courts would be interpreting the safe schools provision
in a practical, common sense manner. This would certainly further the
intent of the voters who approved the safe schools provision.2 62 In addition, an affirmative duty on school boards comports with the principle espoused in federal and state cases that public entities should take
action to protect constitutional rights if inaction by the entity deprives
people of a constitutional right.2 63 One effect of implementing the safe
schools provision in this manner is to increase the costs of security in
252. Deukmejian, supra note 27, at vii; see also 17 Cal. 3d at 296, 551 P.2d at 38, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 734.
253. See 17 Cal. 3d at 296, 551 P.2d at 38, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
254. See Deukmejian, supra note 27, at vii.
255. See 17 Cal. 3d at 296, 551 P.2d at 38, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 734.
256. See supra note 245.
257. See Halatyn,ProperResearch is Vitalto Cutting School Crime, STOP CRIME, Winter 1982,
at 13.
258. See Patsey, supra note 20, at 11.
259. See 17 Cal. 3d at 285, 551 P.2d at 30, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 726; see also 59 Cal. 2d at 881, 382
P.2d at 881, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
260. 59 Cal. 2d at 881, 382 P.2d at 881, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 609.
261. Id.
262. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 207-62 and accompanying text.
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the schools.2 64 Any increase in costs that may occur if the school district is charged with an affirmative duty to make schools safe should
265
not bar the courts from imposing that duty.
COST is NOT A BAR TO THE IMPOSITION OF AN AFFIRMATIVE DUTY

Petitioners in Brosnahan v. Brown2 66 sought to invalidate Proposition
8 partly because the costs incurred in implementing the safe schools
provision would be so extensive that the functioning of the public
school system would be severely impaired. 267 The California Supreme
Court summarily characterized petitioner's theory as conjecture and
speculation 268 and refused to invalidate Proposition 8 although implementation might entail substantial public 'funding. 269 Although the
California Supreme Court held the possible costs of implementing the
safe schools provision did not severely impair the functioning of school
systems, 270 costs of implementation may be substantial especially if the
courts impose an affirmative duty on school districts to make their
schools safe.2 7 ' Security measures used by schools are often expensive,2 72 and a school may have difficulty in funding security plans.
School districts, therefore, may assert that courts should not place an
affirmative duty on them to make schools safe because funds are not
available to meet the costs necessary to implement appropriate security
273

measures.

The claim that insufficient funds relieve school districts of their affirmative duty to make schools safe is not a defense supportable by case
law. 7 4 The federal courts have repeatedly held inadequate resources
do not excuse the state from curing unconstitutional practices. 275 The
federal district court in Brenneman v. Madigan276 held when a pretrial
detainee awaits trial in jail simply because he cannot post bail,2 77 the
purpose of his confinement is only to assure his presence at trial.2 78
264. See Cal. Voter Pamphlet, supra note 2, at 32 (fiscal effects).
265. See infra notes 266-300 and accompanying text.
266. 32 Cal. 3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal. Rptr. 30 (1982).
267. Id. at 258, 651 P.2d at 287, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 43.
268. See id.
269. Id. at 260, 651 P.2d at 288, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
270. See id. at 259-60, 651 P.2d at 288, 186 Cal. Rptr. at 44.
271. See supra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
272. See Harris, Cramping Your Arsonist's Style and Culling Energy Cost-All by Conputer,
THRUST, Oct. 1981, at 19.
273. See Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's Demurrer at 132, No. C 323360 (Sup. Ct. County
of L. A. filed May 21, 1980).
274. See infra notes 275-86 and accompanying text.
275. See infra notes 276-86 and accompanying text.
276. 343 F. Supp. 128 (N. D. Cal.) (1972).
277. See id. at 135 (definition of pre-trial detainee in this context).
278. See id. at 138.
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The purpose of confinement of a person convicted of crime, however, is
punishment and rehabilitation. 9 Constitutionally, then, the pretrial
detainee may only be deprived of his right to come and go as he pleases
and may not be confined under the same conditions as convicted prisoners. The court held that suitable facilities had to be built to hold
pretrial detainees,"' and lack of staff, facilities and finances would not
excuse the jail administrators from their duty to protect the constitutional rights of pretrial detainees.2"'
The Brenneman holding that lack of resources does not excuse the
state from curing unconstitutional practices was reaffirmed in Smith v.
Sullivan.282 The Smith court affirmed a ruling by the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas that the conditions of
an El Paso County jail constituted a violation of the federal constitutional guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment.2 83 The District
Court Judge ordered a detailed program to improve the conditions of
confinement at the jail.284 The program included various projects such
as an exercise and rehabilitation program, a ventilation and lighting
program, a medical program and a jail personnel, safety and supervision program.2 8 5 The Smith court rejected the county officials' argument they lacked funds to implement the trial court's order because the
deprivation of constitutional rights can never be justified by inadequate
286
resources.
As stated previously, the California courts may enforce the right to
safe schools by placing an affirmative duty on school districts to make
their schools safe. 287 When the school district asserts this duty is excused because there are no available funds to implement security measures at schools, the district asserts a defense that is not tolerated in the
federal courts as a defense to the affirmative duty of the state to protect
federal constitutional rights. If alleged, this defense should be equally
disallowed against affirmatively protecting state constitutional rights.
In each federal case discussed above, the court ordered the state to
eliminate conditions that not only deprived persons of their constitutional rights, but that also deprived them of their physical health and
mental well-being. 2 8 To a certain extent, the unhealthy conditions
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id.
See id. at 139.
Id.
553 F.2d 373 (5th Cir.) (1977).
Id. at 378.

284. See id. at 375.
285.
286.
287.
288.

See id. at 375-76.
See id. at 378.
See supra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
See 553 F.2d at 375; see also 343 F. Supp. at 133.
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under which students and staff members attend schools in California
approach the severity of those found in the jails of Texas and California.289 Crime and violence found on school campuses would certainly
violate the constitutional right to attend safe, secure and peaceful campuses. Also, crime and violence on school campuses threaten the physical health and mental well-being of students and staff of public
schools.2 90 This situation, because it is analogous to the federal court
situation, should prompt the California courts to adopt the principle
that school districts may not argue inadequate funds to be relieved of
their duty to make schools safe.
The inadequate funds defense may also be discredited on the basis of
article I, section 22 of the California Constitution. This section provides that all constitutional provisions are "Mandatoryand prohibitory
unless the provision expressly indicates otherwise."' The safe schools
provision states that all students and staff have the inalienable right to
safe schools.2 92 Since there is no express language in the text of the safe
schools provision indicating the provision is not mandatory and prohibitory, then the safe schools provision is mandatory and prohibitory.
The effect of this conclusion is that all state entities, legislative, executive or judicial, must obey the constitutional provision.2 93 The meaning of a constitutional provision, ascertained by rules of construction,
actually determines what must be obeyed. 294 As previously determined
through rules of construction, the safe schools provision may be interpreted to impose an affirmative duty on school districts to make schools
safe. This affirmative duty is, therefore, mandatory and should not be
disregarded for any reason including cost. The California Supreme
Court in Jenkins v. Knight2 95 held that the governor was commanded
by article IV, section 12 of the California Constitution to call a special
election to fill legislative vacancies.29 6 The Governor was not permitted to avoid this duty even though his motive in not calling an election
was to avoid expenses.29 7 While the Governor in Jenkins did not argue
there were no funds to hold special elections,29 8 the Jenkins opinion
evidences a position not to allow constitutional provisions to be depen289. Students today must attend schools that are riddled by rapes, murders, theft and muggings. See Patsey, supra note 20, at 11.
290. Deukmejian, supra note 27, at vii.
291. CAL. CONsT. art. I, §22.
292. Id. §28(c).
293. See 13 CAL. JUR. 3d Constitutional Law §29 (1974).
294. Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 160 Cal. 30, 40-41, 116 P. 722, 726 (1911).
295. 46 Cal. 2d 220, 293 P.2d 6 (1956).
296. Id. at 224, 293 P.2d at 8.
297. See id. at 225, 293 P.2d at 9.
298. See id.
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dent on outside factors like cost. 299 The school district's mandatory
duty to make schools safe also should not be dependent on cost.
An order that schools have a duty to make schools safe may seem
harsh when the school districts claim they have no funds to pay for
security measures, but these claims of inadequate funds carry less
weight now that education has been given the highest cost of living
adjustment of any program in the newly proposed budget of California."°° Once established that the courts will enforce the safe schools
provision by imposing an affirmative duty on school districts to make
their schools safe and the cost is not a bar to the duty, the next inquiry
is what remedies are available for violations of the right to safe schools.
Two likely remedies afforded by a violation of the safe schools provision would be injunction and damages. 30 1 The next section will examine primarily the causes of action for damages.
DAMAGES AS A REMEDY FOR DEPRIVATION OF THE RIGHT
TO SAFE SCHOOLS

The safe schools provision does not specify a particular remedy for a
violation of its terms.30 2 This, of course, does not mean that a remedy is
not available. If a constitutional provision is self-executing, for example, injunctive relief is available without legislation providing a remedy. 30 3 Since the safe schools provision is self-executing, at least
injunctive relief is available against the school district when it violates
the constitutional rights of students and staff. An injunction may be
prohibitory, when the school district would be ordered to refrain from
violating the right, or mandatory, when the school district would be
ordered to take affirmative action to cure the violation.3 ° A
mandatory injunction imposed on the school districts to protect students and staff against crime and violence is an appropriate remedy.
Courts have already manifested an intent to order school districts to
protect the constitutional rights of students in the school desegregation
cases. In Crawford v. Board of Education3°5 the California Supreme
Court stated the school district had an obligation to undertake reason299. Id.
300. Sacramento Union, Jan. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 4. The proposed budget of Governor
Deukmejian provides a six percent cost of living adjustment to education levels kindergarten
through senior high school. In addition to the six percent increase, the proposed budget provides
three million dollars to suppress drug abuse in schools. Id.
301. See infra notes 302-54 and accompanying text.
302. See CAL. CONST. art. 1, §28(c).
303. See Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 851 n.16, 182
Cal. Rptr. 813, 834 (1982), wherein the court holds that the free speech clause is self-executing,
and thus, injunctive relief is available without enabling legislation.
304. Dosch v. King, 192 Cal. App. 2d 800, 804, 13 Cal. Rptr. 765, 768 (1961).
305. 17 Cal. 3d 280, 551 P.2d 28, 130 Cal. Rptr. 724.
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ably feasible steps to alleviate school segregation. 0 6 The court also
stated when the school board could not demonstrate an immediate
commitment to instituting such steps, the court would intervene to protect the constitutional rights being violated.307 The intervention would
be formulating a plan to alleviate segregation which the school district
would be ordered to adopt.30 8
If the courts are willing to grant a mandatory injunction ordering the
school district to desegregate, then they also ought to grant a
mandatory injunction ordering the school district to make its schools
safe. This remedy is certainly consistent with the mandate of the safe
30 9
schools provision that school districts must make their schools safe.
The effect of such a mandatory injunction, then, is that the school district must undertake reasonably feasible steps to alleviate crime and
violence on school campuses.3 l0 If the school district fails to implement
any steps, the courts will intervene and impose their own plan for alle311
viating crime and violence on school campuses.
This remedy of injunctive relief and judicial intervention is not the
only method for vindicating a violation of the constitutional right to
safe schools. There is no guarantee that a school district will implement even a court ordered plan, or if the district does implement a
plan, that the district will adequately carry out the plan's measures.
Another remedy available to the student and staff member of a public
school, then, is damages. Damages may be afforded under two theories, a tort theory and a constitutional theory.
A.

The Tort Claims Act

As previously discussed, the tort liability of a government entity,
either at the state level or local level, is governed by the Tort Claims
Act.312 Section 815(a) of the Tort Claims Act states that a public entity
is not liable for the negligence of the public entity or a public employee
unless a statute so provides.3 1 3 Thus, for the school district to be liable

for damages, a specific statute needs to be found that sets forth the
liability. 314
306. Id. at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
307. Id. at 306-07, 551 P.2d at 45, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 741.
308. Id. at 307, 551 P.2d at 46, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
309. See supra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
310. See 17 Cal. 3d at 302, 551 P.2d at 42, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 738.
311. See id. at 307, 551 P.2d at 46, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
312. Rubino v. Lol, 10 Cal. App. 3d 1059, 1063, 89 Cal. Rptr. 320, 322 (1970); see generall,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 810-996 (setting forth the statutes by which the Government may be held
liable); see also 35 CAL. JUR. 3d Government Tort Liability §1 (1974).
313. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §815(a).
314. See id.
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In the school safety situation, the school district may be liable for
damages under the Tort Claims Act, section 815.6. 311 This section provides that when the public entity has a mandatory duty imposed by an
enactment to protect against a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for any injury that proximately occurs by its failure to
carry out the duty unless the entity has used reasonable diligence to
carry out the duty.316 The California Law Revision Commission interpreted this section to mean that when a statutory or regulatory standard
there has been reasonable
is not adhered to, negligence occurs unless
317
diligence to comply with the standards.
The safe schools provision is not a statute or a regulation; nevertheless, section 815.6 may apply. The first requirement of section 815.6 is
that a mandatory duty be imposed on a public entity by an enactment. 3 1 A school district is certainly a public entity as contemplated
by the Tort Claims Act. 31 9 The question remains whether the safe
schools provision is an enactment which imposes a mandatory duty.
Section 810.6 of the Tort Claims Act defines enactment as a "constitutional provision, statute, charter provision, ordinance or regulation."3 2 The safe schools provision is a constitutional provision and is,
therefore, an enactment as contemplated by the Tort Claims Act.
"Mandatory," as defined by this section, refers to duties which the public entity must perform and not to those powers which the public entity
may or may not choose to exercise.3 2 ' The safe schools provision as a
constitutional provision is mandatory by definition.32 2 If the courts impose an affirmative duty on school districts to make their schools safe,
the first requirement of section 815.6 will be met. The school district
has a mandatory duty to make schools safe imposed by an enactment,
the safe schools provision.
The second requirement is that the enactment be designed to protect
against a particular kind of injury.32 3 The most obvious type of injury
the safe schools provision is designed to prevent is injury to students
and staff members of public schools due to crime or violence. 324 The
315. Seeid. §815.6.
316. Id.
317. Id. §815.6 (Law Review Commission comment on section 815.6).
318. See 1d. §815.6.
319. School districts have been held liable for damages under the Tort Claims Act. E.g., Dailey v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 2 Cal. 3d 741, 747, 470 P. 2d 360, 363, 87 Cal. Rptr. 376,
379 (1970).
320. CAL. GOV'T CODE §810.6.
321. Morris v. Manin County, 18 Cal. 3d 901, 908, 559 P.2d 606, 610, 136 Cal. Rptr. 251, 255
(1977).
322. See CAL. CONsT. art. 1, §22.
323. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §815.6.
324. See supra notes 101-22 and accompanying text.
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injury would not be limited to injuries due to attacks upon the physical
person of students and staff members.32 5 The injury could also be damage to or loss of property due to crime and violence.32 6
The last requirement of section 815.6 is that the contemplated injury
did occur and the injury was proximately caused by failure of the public entity to discharge its duty.327 The school district, then, could be
liable for injuries to students and staff members caused by crime and
violence if the school district failed to carry out its duty to make schools
safe.3 28 The school district, as provided in section 815.6, may avoid this
liability for injuries due to crime and violence only if the district establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to make schools safe.3 29
A student or staff member of a public school may recover damages
from the school district if he proves the school district failed to discharge its duty to make schools safe or failed to use reasonable diligence to discharge its duty and if he proves he is injured as a proximate
result of the school district's failure. The damages recoverable under
this theory are compensatory only, as section 818 exempts a public entity from punitive damages. 330 A student or staff member, however,
need not resort to a theory of negligence to recover damages for a violation of his constitutional right to safe schools.
B. ConstitutionalRemedy
To recover damages against the state under a negligence cause of
action, a specific statute must allow the action. 33 In California, however, enabling legislation is not necessary to recover damages for constitutional deprivations. 332 The principle that a cause of action for
damages arises from a violation of California constitutional rights was
subscribed to by the appellate court in Melvin v. Reid.3 33 The court
determined that the appellant's fundamental right to pursue and obtain
happiness was directly invaded and the invasions must not be tolerated. 334 Appellant's action, which included a count for damages, was
allowed to proceed despite the trial court's judgment of dismissal. 335
325. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §810.8 (defining injury under the Tort Liability Act as not limited

to physical harm).
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
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Id. §818.
See supra notes 312-15 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 333-54 and accompanying text.
112 CaL App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931).
Id. at 292, 297 P. at 93-94.
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The appellate court, in Porten v. University of San Francisco,336 reaffirmed the principle that constitutional provisions afford a cause of action for damages. Porten's complaint, which included a request for
damages, 3 37 was dismissed without leave to amend for failure to state a
cause of action for the tort of invasion of privacy.33 8 The California
Constitution, however, declares the right to pursue privacy is an inalienable right. 339 The court held the right to privacy was self-executing
and, therefore, conferred a "judicial right of action on all Californians." 34 0 Porten's complaint was construed as having stated a cause of
action under the constitutional right, and the court overruled the
dismissal.3 4 1
While the court in Porten did not specifically state that damages were
an appropriate remedy, the court in Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden
Rain Foundation3 42 left no doubt that a right to sue for damages is appropriate where a constitutional right is violated.3 43 In this case the
constitutional right in question was California Constitution, article I,
section 2, the free speech clause. 3 " The court of appeal held that the
right to free speech and press deserved as much special consideration as
the inalienable rights and stated that an action for damages was appropriate without enabling legislation.3 45
The safe schools provision should also afford a cause of action for
damages without enabling legislation. The right to safe, secure and
peaceful campuses is an inalienable right34 as are the right to privacy 347 in Porten and the right to pursue and obtain happiness 348 in
Melvin. The determination that the safe schools provision affords a
cause of action for damages means only that the person whose right is
violated may present evidence at trial of damages sustained as a result
of the violation of the right to safe schools. 349 As stated in Laguna, the
damages suffered would have to be actual, demonstrable, and
3 50
compensatory.
336. 64 Cal. App. 3d 825, 134 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1976).
337. See id. at 827, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 840.

338. See id. at 828-29, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

CAL. CONST. art. I, §1.
64 Cal. App. at 829, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 842.
See Id. at 833, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 844.
131 Cal. App. 3d 816, 182 Cal. Rptr. 813.
See id. at 853, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
See id. at 851, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 833-34.
See id. at 853, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835.
See CAL. CONsT. art. I, §28(c).
See id. §1.

348. Id.
349. See 131 Cal. App. at 854, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 835. This court is only deciding if the trial
court erred in not allowing plaintiff to present evidence at trial.
350. See id. at 850-51, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
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The student or staff member of a public school need not rely on an
enabling statute, like section 815.6 of the Tort Claims Act, to recover
damages for a violation of his right to a safe, secure and peaceful campus.35 A cause of action for damages arises from the constitutional
provision for safe schools itself.352 In order to recover under the constitutional cause of action, the student or staff member must be able to
demonstrate that actual and compensatory damages resulted from the
violation of his constitutional right.35 3 This right to present evidence of
damages may not be denied by the courts on the ground that no statute
specifically allows a remedy of damages. 4
CONCLUSION

In June 1982, California voters manifested a desire to fight crime and
violence on school campuses by amending the California Constitution
to include the inalienable right to safe schools. 355 To enforce this right,
California courts will impose an affirmative duty on school districts to
implement plans designed to alleviate crime and violence on school
campuses. 6 By deferring to the school district's judgment, the courts
will assure that the most appropriate and effective methods in ridding
school campuses of crime and violence will be used.3 57

School districts have used various methods successfully to prevent
crime and violence on school campuses.358 Some of these methods are
very costly; however, lack of finances will not be allowed by the courts
as a defense to implementing measures to fight crime and violence.359
When inadequate funds do become a problem, the school official
should consider less costly measures such as a restructuring of school
policies on discipline. A clear, concise and strictly enforced policy of
student discipline has been found to have a positive effect on reducing
school violence and vandalism.36 ° Many programs of national acclaim
have been designed to reduce crime and violence on school campuses,
and through similar methods California school districts may success351. See supra notes 331-50 and accompanying text.
352. See supra notes 332-50 and accompanying text.
353. See 131 Cal. App. 3d at 850-51, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 833.
354. See supra notes 331-53 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 111-18 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.
357. Cf. 17 Cal. 3d at 306, 551 P.2d at 45, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 741. The courts rely on the school
districts to devise their own plans to desegregate, for the districts are better able to deal with the
complexities involved with the causes of segregation. Presumably, the courts would follow the

same pattern for the crime and violence problem since there are also complexities involved with
the causes of crime and violence.
358. See supra note 204.
359. See supra notes 266-300 and accompanying text.
360. See Reeves, supra note 176, at 10.
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fully discharge their duty to make schools safe. 6 '
Through the combined efforts of the school district and the courts,
the safe schools provision will certainly be more than a mere policy
statement. A policy of desiring campuses to be free of crime and violence is, of course, valid, but that policy must be enforced by action.
This is why the courts must impose an affirmative duty on school districts to make their schools safe. 362 The right to safe, secure and peaceful campuses is a viable, enforceable right designed to rid California
schools of crime and violence so a secure and orderly educational environment may be restored to teachers and students.

Kimbery A. Sawyer

361. Several programs recently given national acclaim are: "Developing Student Responsibility for Violence on the High School campus" at Alisal High Schogl in, Salinas, California; "Southern Oregon Drug Awareness Project" at Medford, Oregon; and "Triad Education" at Elk Grove
High School in Elk Grove, California. See National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges announcement, January 1983 (List of presentation of awards from "Focus on Youth Symposium," Reno, Nevada) (copy on file at the Pacific Law Journal).
362. See supra notes 170-263 and accompanying text.

